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Abstract 
  Opponents of school choice sometimes charge that vouchers, charter schools, and tuition tax credits 
would strip funding and talented students from the public schools.  Proponents say this is exactly what is 
needed to provide extra competition for public schools.  Flight to private schools may happen if parents think 
private schools are good substitutes for public schools.  For goods with explicit market prices, economists 
estimate substitutability by specifying a demand curve and finding a cross price elasticity, but the non-market 
nature of schooling has prevented this.  The current study finds a way to estimate the demand for public 
schooling and calculate a cross price elasticity by exploiting Rosen’s (1974) two-stage hedonic technique.  It 
estimates the cross price elasticity between public schooling and the price of private schooling to be 0.32:  
Americans view private schools as fairly weak substitutes for public schools.  The use of spatial statistics 
accounts for potential spillovers and omitted variable bias in the house price hedonics and the demand curve 
estimation.  In fact, the -1.72 price elasticity of demand is much larger than the -0.20 to -0.40 estimates 
generally found by non-spatial studies. 
 
JEL Classification codes:  H41, R21, R22 
Keywords:  local public goods provision, private school competition, spatial statistics, education vouchers, 
spillovers 
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“This was the Super Bowl of school choice, and children won,” –Clint Bolick, Vice President of the 
Institute for Justice, June 27, 2002 
 
“The majority took a wrecking ball today…Vouchers are an unconscionable diversion of resources away 
from the public schools,” –Barry W. Lynn, President of Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, June 27, 2002 (Walsh, 2002) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  School choice programs, in the form of charter schools, school vouchers, and tax credits for private 
school tuition, are becoming more common in the United States.  The legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of government are all active contributors.  For example, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
allows students to transfer out of failing schools and recommends converting thousands of failing public 
schools into charter schools.  President Bush’s 2003 budget proposed giving families up to $2500 per child 
in tax credits if they chose a private school rather than a failing public school.  And in 2002 the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in Zelman v Simmons-Harris that the government may fund vouchers for private, 
religious schools.  What would happen if school choice programs became widespread?  Would parents flee to 
private schools, abandoning the public schools?  The idea of ‘abandoning the public schools’ is broadly 
defined to mean less public schooling demanded.  It means a smaller market share for traditional public 
schools.  It also means less funding for public schools, as money follows students to other schools; and it 
might mean less frequent passage of tax levies.  Abandoning the public schools might also mean greater 
cream-skimming, in which the most talented students leave the public schools (Epple and Romano, 1998; 
Epple, Figlio and Romano, 2004).  Less money and worse peer effects might reduce public school quality, so 
‘abandoning the public schools’ also implies a lower quality of public schooling demanded.  But whether 
school choice programs like vouchers and tax credits would make parents abandon public schools for private 
schools is an empirical question.  The answer depends on the degree to which parents perceive public and 
private schools to be substitutes, and it is this substitutability that the current study explores.   
  The degree to which public and private schools are substitutes has special importance for school 
voucher programs.  Currently in the United States tax money funds public schools, and residents who live in   3
a public school district may send their children to their own public school for no extra charge.  If residents 
want to send their children to a private school or a different public school district, they must continue to pay 
taxes for their assigned public school and additionally pay full tuition for the school their child attends.  
School choice programs break the link between houses and public school district assignments.  One school 
choice program is a school voucher.  If the assigned public school district spends $7,000 per pupil, one form 
of school voucher system would give parents a voucher worth $7,000 which may be redeemed at the 
assigned public school, or it may be used toward tuition at the public or private school of the parents’ choice.  
Some polling suggests that about 60% of Americans favor private school vouchers (Walsh, 2001).  The 
strongest supporters of vouchers are racial minorities and people living in low-income areas with poor 
quality public schools (Walsh, 2001; Sandy, 1992).  Voucher programs have been proposed or enacted in 
California, Florida, Michigan, Louisiana, Maine, D.C., Colorado, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, San Antonio, 
Atlanta, Cleveland, Vermont, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and other states and cities throughout the United 
States (Merrifield, 2002).  In 2005 the Arizona senate passed an unrestricted private school voucher bill, and 
in 2006 Governor Pataki introduced a tax credit for parents in New York who choose private schools. 
  With the increasing public awareness, it is useful to ask whether school choice will provide 
competition for public schools.  Stronger competitive effects will be seen the more private and public schools 
are seen as close substitutes.  Opponents of vouchers point out that a voucher system may gut public schools, 
transferring students and their associated funding away from the already cash-strapped public schools toward 
private schools.  This ‘mass exodus’ argument assumes that private schools are seen as good substitutes for 
public schools.  So in order to better evaluate the likely competitive effects of vouchers and to assess the 
validity of the mass exodus objection to private school vouchers, it is necessary to estimate the degree to 
which Americans perceive public and private schools to be substitutes.   
Some previous research has investigated the sensitivity of private school enrollment to tuition, and 
the relationship between public school expenditures and private school enrollment.  These studies have   4
provided valuable (but contradictory) insights on the degree to which public and private schooling are 
substitutes.  However, in introductory microeconomics courses, students are taught to measure substitutes 
and complements from the cross price elasticity of demand.  The non-market nature of schooling has 
prevented researchers from estimating the cross price elasticity of demand.  But the current study exploits the 
theory of implicit markets (Rosen, 1974) to find the price of a unit of public schooling from the housing 
market.  It can then estimate the demand for public schooling to find the cross price elasticity between public 
and private schooling, to see to what extent Americans view public and private schools as substitutes.  If 
private schools are strong substitutes for public schools, school choice programs may induce an exodus of 
students and money from public schools to private schools, and scare public schools into providing higher 
quality service at a lower price (Figlio and Rouse, 2006).  If private schools are weak substitutes for public 
schools, school choice programs might subsidize private—and often religious—schools, increase taxes
1, and 
fail to provide much additional competition for public schools.  
  The empirical estimation consists of first estimating a series of house price hedonic regressions, then 
using the results from the first stage to estimate the demand for public schooling.  The estimation technique, 
spatial statistics, addresses identification and spatial dependence, which may arise from spillovers and 
omitted variables.  Private schooling appears to be a fairly weak substitute for public schooling.  The cross 
price elasticity of demand is 0.32.  Furthermore, the cross price elasticity of demand is nearly identical for 
rich and poor households.  The weak cross price elasticity may help explain the low take-up rate on some 
school choice programs.  Only 1097 out of 270,000 eligible students transferred from failing schools in 
Chicago under the No Child Left Behind Act, and only 215 transferred out of 204,000 eligible in Los 
Angeles (Helfand and Rubin, 2004). 
  The study finds the elasticity of house price with respect to public proficiency test scores is 0.15.  
Own price elasticity of demand for public schooling is -1.72 and the income elasticity of demand is 0.31.  
The spatial statistical technique makes a large difference in demand parameter estimates such as the price   5
elasticity of demand, the income elasticity of demand, and the role of Catholics and persons with less than a 
bachelor’s degree.  Compared to those living in houses with three or fewer bedrooms, people who live in 
houses with a large number of bedrooms have stronger cross price and income elasticities of demand for 
public schooling. 
 
2. Previous Literature 
 
Previous studies have estimated the cross price elasticity of demand for competition between public 
and private universities (Allen and Shen, 1999), but not between public and private elementary and 
secondary schools.  Previous studies have also investigated the price elasticity of demand for private 
schooling (Chiswick and Koutromanes, 1996; Hoenack, 1997).  Others investigate the effect public school 
expenditures has on private school enrollment (Hamilton and Macauley, 1991; Goldhaber, 1999), and the 
effect of private school enrollment on public school expenditures (Erekson, 1982; Goldhaber, 1999).   
Buddin, Cordes and Kirby (1998) regress a family’s decision to use private schools as a function of both 
private school tuition and public school proficiency test scores.  But while these studies all provide valuable 
information about the determinants of the demand for public and private schooling, none has calculated a 
cross price elasticity between public and private schooling.  There is a reason they have not. 
 
3. Analytical Framework 
3.1 Rosen’s (1974) First Stage House Price Hedonic 
A demand function contains the price of the good, the price of related goods, and other demand 
shifters.  Because there is no explicit market, there is no readily observable unit price of public schooling.  
This lack of data is probably what has kept researchers from calculating a cross price elasticity of demand.  
Despite the lack of explicit prices, the implicit price of public schooling may be inferred from the housing 
market using the hedonic approach, and the implicit price may be used to estimate a demand curve (Rosen,   6
1974).  Rosen (p. 40) points out that his implicit market framework is particularly well-suited to the analysis 
of local public goods like schooling, and many studies have used Rosen’s technique to find the capitalization 
of and demand for non-market goods like environmental quality (Brasington and Hite, 2005; Beron, 
Murdoch and Thayer, 2001; Zabel and Kiel, 2000) and schooling services (Brasington, 2002; Reiter and 
Weichenrieder, 1997; Jud and Watts, 1981).   
The first stage in Rosen’s two-stage demand technique is to regress house price as a function of the 
attributes of housing, to find the marginal attribute prices.  But there is an identification problem between the 
first-stage hedonic and the second-stage demand regressions (Tinbergen, 1956; Brown and H. Rosen, 1982).  
Although there are single-equation methods to address identification (e.g., Quigley, 1982; Ekeland, et al., 
2002), Brown and Rosen’s (1982) market segmentation approach is the most widely accepted solution in the 
literature.  According to Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2002, p. 307), “If preferences are stable and the 
distributions of preferences across markets are stable, but technologies are different for exogenous reasons, 
then multimarket variation [Brown and Rosen’s approach] shifts the hedonic function against stable 
preferences and identifies preference parameters.”   
This study therefore derives marginal prices following Brown and Rosen’s suggested method of 
segmenting the sample by housing market to deal with the identification problem.  A separate hedonic house 
price function is estimated for each of the seven major urban areas in Ohio.  Estimating each urban area 
separately results in seven schooling coefficients.   
3.2 Rosen’s (1974) Second Stage Demand Estimation  
The seven coefficients from the first-stage house price hedonics are used to calculate the implicit 
price of public school quality, which is the partial derivative of house price with respect to public school 
quality in each hedonic.  The implicit prices are then pooled and a single demand equation is estimated to 
achieve identification.  All previous segmentation studies use urban areas to segment their housing markets, 
and they commonly use four to seven urban areas (e.g., Palmquist, 1984; Brasington, 2003; Zabel and Kiel,   7
2000).  Armed with a price of public schooling, the demand for public schooling may be estimated, yielding 
the cross price elasticity between public schooling and the price of private schooling. 
 
4.  Econometric Issues 
4.1 The First Stage House Price Hedonics 
Consider the traditional least squares hedonic estimation given by Equation (1), where v is house 
value and X is the matrix of explanatory variables: 
v = Xβ + ε,  ε  ~ N(0,σ
2)         ( 1 )  
House price hedonic regressions with individual sale prices such as Equation (1) tend not to be statistically 
independent.  In fact, tests for statistical independence often show spatial autocorrelation in the residuals.  
Spatial autocorrelation is expected for at least three reasons.  One, nearby houses have similar prices.  Two, 
neighbors’ behavior can affect a house’s value directly or through subdivision associations.  And three, non-
housing determinants of house value are not fully captured by the variables included in the hedonic 
regressions (LeSage, 1997).  Estimating Equation (1) with ordinary least squares does not account for spatial 
dependence between observations, which may lead to biased, inefficient and inconsistent parameter estimates 
(Anselin, 1988, p. 58-59).   
The general spatial model addresses the problem of spatial dependence.  The general spatial model 
includes a spatial lag of the dependent variable as well as a spatial lag of the residual as in Equation (2): 
 
v = ρW1v + Xβ +μ      (2)  
μ = λW2 μ +ε ,  ε  ~ N(0,σ
2In)      
In Equation (2) the scalar term ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter to be estimated.  It measures 
the degree of spatial dependence between the values of nearby houses in the sample.  The W terms are n by n 
spatial weight matrices.  They have non-zero entries in the i,jth position, reflecting houses that are nearest 
neighbors to each of the i homes in the sample.  The current study uses Delauney triangularization (Pace,   8
2003) to construct the spatial weight matrices W1 and W2.  The Delauney triangularization technique uses a 
contiguity algorithm to select the optimal number of neighbors to allow for each house and assigns the 
weight each neighboring house is given.  For example, house number 1052 might be assigned four neighbors 
with weights 0.10, 0.30, 0.25, and 0.35, while house number 15,382 might be assigned six neighbors with 
weights 0.50, 0.15, 0.15, 0.05, 0.05 and 0.10.
2  In this manner the spatial weight matrix W summarizes the 
spatial configuration of the houses in the sample.  Next, μ is the vector of residuals, which also exhibits 
spatial dependence.  The degree of spatial dependence in the residuals is estimated by the parameter λ, while 
ε is a white noise error term.  Equation (2) uses the same weight matrix to represent both W1 and W2.  
Previous research (Anselin, 1988) claims ρ and λ are not identified when the same W is used, but Kelejian 
and Prucha (2004) prove they are. 
The model in Equation (2) uses maximum likelihood, which may help with identification of the 
demand curve beyond the traditional method of market segmentation (Epple, 1987).  The log-likelihood for 
the model in Equation (2) takes the following form (LeSage, 1998, p.61): 
ln L = C – (n/2) ln (σ
2) + ln(|A|) + ln (|B|)  - ( σ
2/2)ln(e΄B΄Be)            (3) 
where   
e = (Av - Xβ)       (4) 
A = (In - ρW1) 
B = (In - ρW2) 
and C is a constant term that does not involve the parameters.   
The need to compute the log-determinant of the n by n matrix (In - ρW) makes it computationally 
difficult to solve the maximum likelihood problem in Equations (3) and (4).  Operation counts for computing 
the determinant grow with the cube of n for dense matrices.  However, W is sparse:  most of its elements are 
zeroes.  The sparsity of W may be exploited (Pace, 1997; Pace and Barry, 1997a, 1997b) so that a personal 
computer can handle the large data set estimations with relative ease.  The Cholesky decomposition is used   9
to estimate the log-determinant |In - ρW| over a grid of values for ρ restricted to the interval [0,1].  This log 
determinant uses the Monte Carlo estimator set forth by Barry and Pace (1999), which allows larger 
problems to be tackled without the memory requirements or sensitivity to orderings associated with the direct 
sparse matrix approach.   
Spatial statistics greatly improves cross-sectional regression estimates that are spatial in nature.  Part 
of the improvement stems from incorporating the influence of omitted variables (Anselin, 1988, p.103; Pace, 
Barry and Sirmans, 1998).  Traditional hedonic estimation does not address omitted variable bias.  Attempts 
to circumvent the problem include focusing on narrow geographic areas where many influences are already 
controlled for, or including vast numbers of explanatory variables to capture every influence which diligent 
data collection can offer.  The benefits of spatial statistics over alternative approaches are discussed in 
Brasington and Haurin (2006).  An intuitive explanation of how spatial statistics helps capture the influence 
of omitted variable bias is included in Brasington and Hite (2005), while a mathematical proof is available in 
Griffith (1988, p. 94-107). 
4.2 The Second Stage Demand Regression 
  The same spatial dependence and omitted variable problem that affects the first stage house price 
hedonic regressions also affects the second stage demand regression.  While the general spatial model was 
determined to be the most appropriate model for the first stage hedonic regressions, the spatial error model is 
the most appropriate model for the second stage demand regressions.
3
  The spatial error model is the same as 
Equation (2) but with ρ = 0.  The log-likelihood for this model may be found in Brasington and Sarama 
(2005) and LeSage (1999, p.76). 
  The second-stage demand regression must also correct for the endogeneity of the quantity of public 
schooling.  Actually, instrumentation may not be necessary when spatial statistics is used (Brasington and 
Hite, 2005).  Endogeneity is a problem of omitted factors being correlated with the regressors.  Spatial 
statistics helps control for the influence of omitted variables, thus alleviating the need to treat regressors   10
endogenously.  But there is no harm done to the spatial estimation technique by instrumenting (Anselin, 
1988).  Therefore the price of public schooling is instrumented in the demand regression.  Another potential 
problem in the estimation of the demand curve is Tiebout bias (Goldstein and Pauly, 1981).  Rubinfeld, et al. 
(1987) inspire the inclusion of the community growth rate to help mitigate Tiebout bias, which helps capture 
people moving in recently. 
 
5.  Data 
5.1  Choice of First Stage House Price Hedonic Variables 
  The house price hedonic regressions in Equation (2) are based on a data set of 93,134 houses that 
sold in the year 2000 in the state of Ohio.  The house transactions are spread throughout the seven major 
urban areas in Ohio:  Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown, and the 
average sale price is $135,543.  The house characteristics used are an air conditioning dummy, the number of 
fireplaces, the number of full and partial bathrooms, square feet of lot, age of the house, and the size of the 
house.  The squares of lot size, house size, and age are included because these variables may influence a 
house’s value in a nonlinear fashion.   
  Many community attributes may affect house price.  One may rely on the spatial statistical technique 
to capture the influence of the community attributes, like Dubin (1998), but there is no harm in specifically 
controlling for neighborhood attributes (Brasington and Haurin, 2006).  We include the tax rate, air pollution, 
neighborhood racial heterogeneity, and neighborhood income levels as controls.  To control for the 
attractiveness of private schools, we include math proficiency test passage rates for the nearest private school 
to each house.  But the focus variable, the variable from which Rosen’s implicit price must be calculated, is 
the quality of schooling in each house’s assigned public school district. 
[Insert Table 1 about here]   11
Public schooling is one of the most important determinants of house price.  Recent  house price 
hedonic studies have measured school quality by per-pupil expenditures, proficiency test scores, and value 
added measures.  Brasington and Haurin (2006) reject the use of value added measures.  They find 
proficiency test scores are the most consistently valued measure of school quality, with expenditures a 
reasonable substitute when proficiency tests are unavailable.  In fact, the Brasington and Haurin regressions, 
which are based on the same data as in the current study, report that representative value added measures 
have the anticipated relation with house price in only 11 out of 48 regressions.  Although expenditures will 
be tried also, the main school performance variable adopted is the passage rate on the Ohio 9th-grade 
proficiency test.  The sections are reading, writing, math, science, and citizenship.
4   
Because seven house price hedonic regressions are performed, Table 2 shows variable means for 
each of the seven urban areas. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
5.2  Choice of Second Stage Demand Variables 
  The implicit price of a unit of public schooling is created from the first stage house price hedonic 
regressions and used as the dependent variable in a demand for public school quality regression.  The 
quantity of public schooling is measured by proficiency passage (Brasington, 2002; Duncombe and Yinger, 
2000; Jud and Watts, 1981).  To estimate the cross price elasticity public and private schooling, private 
school tuition is chosen as the price of private schooling.
5   
There are reasons aside from quality and price that determine whether a household uses private or 
public schools.  Houses are assigned to nearby public schools, but the nearest private school may be far 
away, making private school attendance unattractive or impractical.  For this reason the distance from each 
house to the nearest private school is included as a control variable in the demand regression.  In addition, 
most private schools in Ohio are Catholic religious schools.  To control for the desire for religious 
instruction, the percent of Catholics in the region is included.   12
The growth rate of the community is included to help control for Tiebout bias, as described in the 
Econometric Issues section.  Other variables are included as potential shifters of the demand for public 
schooling.  These include income levels, education levels, and the percentage of houses that are owner-
occupied, as opposed to renter-occupied.  Table 3 shows the definitions, sources, and means of the variables 
used in the demand regression. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
6.  Estimation Results 
6.1 First Stage House Price Hedonic Regression Results 
        The results of the seven house price hedonic regressions are shown in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
        The spatial hedonic regressions in Table 4 explain a large percentage of the variation in house price; 
adjusted R-squared ranges from 0.75 to 0.81.  The estimated spatial lag of the dependent variable ρ ranges 
from -0.002 to 0.23, and four of the ρ estimates are statistically significant.  This suggests mild spatial 
autoregressive effects.  On the other hand, the spatial error lag is always statistically significant, and the 
average magnitude is 0.38, suggesting moderate error dependence.  The parameter estimates of the house 
characteristics generally have the expected sign.     
           The focus variables are the measures of public and private school quality.  Private school proficiency 
test passage is positively related to house prices in four of seven regressions.  There are no studies in the 
literature with which to compare elasticities, as far as the author is aware.  Public school proficiency is 
positively related to house price in six of the seven hedonic regressions.  Because the dependent variable and 
the public proficiency variable are measured in natural logs, the parameter estimates are elasticities.
6  Among 
the six significant estimates, Toledo has the lowest elasticity of house price with respect to proficiency test 
scores:  0.07; Akron has the largest:  0.29.
7  The parameter estimates differ because there are different supply   13
and demand conditions for schooling in each urban area.  The availability of housing in school districts of 
different quality is not uniform, and there is a different supply of public and private schools in each urban 
area, which contributes to the different parameter estimates.
8  Having variation in the parameter estimates 
helps achieve identification in the manner Palmquist (1984), Epple (1987), Brown and Rosen (1982), Zabel 
and Kiel (2000), and Brasington (2003) suggest.  The average elasticity of house prices with respect to public 
proficiency passage is 0.15, which compares to 0.21 in Brasington (2002), 0.54 in Hayes and Taylor (1996), 
0.20 in Hite, et al. (2001), 0.76 in Clapp, Nanda and Ross (2005), 0.19 in Jud and Watts (1981), 1.10 in 
Downes and Zabel (2002), and 0.27 in Figlio and Lucas (2004).
9
6.2 Second Stage Demand Regression Results  
  The results of the demand for public education regressions begin in Table 5.   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Second-stage hedonic demand estimations traditionally use least squares and limited information 
maximum likelihood (LIML).  Demand is first estimated using these traditional approaches so the impact of 
using spatial statistics in the Delauney SEM column may be assessed.
10  The Delauney SEM column is a 
spatial error model where the weight matrix is formed by Delauney triangularization.  The adjusted R-
squared jumps from 0.13 in the non-spatial models to 0.66 in the Delauney SEM model, and the spatial error 
parameter is 0.81, which is large and highly statistically significant, suggesting that ignoring spatial 
dependence could markedly alter estimation results. 
The OLS and LIML columns of Table 5 show a weaker parameter estimate for the quantity of public 
schooling than the Delauney SEM model.  Most demand studies report a price elasticity of demand ranging 
from -0.20 to -0.40 (Reiter and Weichenrieder, 1997), and a non-spatial demand study using a similar Ohio 
data set reports an elasticity of -0.11 (Brasington, 2002).  But the price variables in the current study are 
calculated from house price hedonics and demand regressions that address spatial dependence.  The   14
Delauney SEM price elasticity of demand of -1.72 suggests that ignoring spatial dependence biases the 
price elasticity of demand upward.
11   
DISTANCE TO PRIVATE SCHOOL is significantly related to the demand for public schooling in 
all models, but the magnitude of the elasticity drops from 0.20 in the OLS model to a trivial 0.08 in the 
Delauney SEM model.  All else constant, having a larger percentage of Catholics is positively related to the 
demand for public schooling, although the elasticity drops from 1.72 in the OLS model to 0.74 in the 
Delauney SEM model.  The income elasticity of demand is a trivial 0.07 in the OLS model but rises to 0.31 
in the Delauney SEM model.  The 0.31 estimate is slightly stronger than that found by Rubinfeld, Shapiro 
and Roberts (1982), slightly weaker than the 0.38 to 0.83 range found by Bergstrom and Goodman (1982), 
weaker than the 0.87 found by Duncombe and Yinger (2000), and nearly identical to the 0.32 estimate found 
by Brasington (2002) using 1991 Ohio data in non-spatial regressions.  Going from non-spatial to spatial 
models makes OWNER OCCUPIED and %LESS B.A. flip signs. 
The focus variable is TUITION, from which the cross price elasticity between the quantity of public 
schooling and the price of private schooling is calculated.  The OLS and LIML models show cross price 
elasticities of 0.65 and 0.60, while the Delauney SEM elasticity is 0.32.  Allen and Shen (1999) find the 
cross price elasticity between private college enrollments and public university tuition is –0.02.  One may 
debate how comparable the elasticities are between the different levels of schooling, but the literature 
provides little comparison for the 0.32 elasticity.   
The 0.32 cross price elasticity must be carefully interpreted, both in what it says and what it cannot 
say.  It is positive, which says private schooling is a substitute for public schooling.  The literal interpretation 
is that, at the mean, a one percent decrease in the price of private schooling would be associated with a 0.32 
percent fall in the demand for public schooling.  But average private school tuition in Ohio is $6600, so a one 
percent fall in the price of private schooling would amount to less than a $100 voucher.  All partial voucher 
proposals are more generous than this.  Suppose President Bush’s $1500 voucher bill had passed in 2001.    15
Suppose average private school tuition were $6600 and parents could supplement the voucher with 
additional money.  It is also important to consider public school taxes.  Average expenditures per public 
school student in Ohio is currently $7982.  But because not every adult (or corporation) has children, and the 
amount everyone pays toward public schools varies by person, it is difficult to estimate how much the typical 
person pays for public schools.  For a rough approximation, through property and income and sales taxes, 
suppose the typical parent pays $3000 for public schools, which gets paid whether the parent uses public 
school or not.  In these circumstances a $1500 voucher would reduce the price of attending private schools 
from ($3000 + $6600 =) $9600 to ($3000 + $6600 - $1500) = $8100, reducing the price of private schooling 
by about 16%. The 0.32 elasticity implies that the $1500 voucher would reduce the demand for public 
schooling by (0.16 * 0.32 =) 5.1%.   
The mechanisms behind the 5.1% reduced demand could take many forms, but the end result is a 
5.1% lower amount of public schooling demanded.  Exactly what combination of student transfers from 
public schools, reduced public school expenditures, and cream-skimming cause the 5.1% decline cannot be 
specified, but flight from public schools, reduced expenditures, and cream-skimming are inter-related.  As 
the brightest students flee the public schools (Epple and Romano, 1998), the lower peer effects depress 
public school outcomes.  As students take their voucher money to private schools, public school budgets are 
cut, perhaps leading to larger class sizes and lower schooling outcomes.  And as the constituent base of the 
public schools erodes, tax levies are more difficult to pass, also reducing school budgets.  The numerical 
example of a $1500 voucher possibly leading to a 5.1% drop gives the impression that, at least in the short 
run, a voucher system would not cause people to demand much less public schooling, and something less 
than a mass exodus of parents would switch from public to private schools.  But there are other effects of 
vouchers, which are touched upon in the conclusion.  
  The Delauney triangularization chooses the number of neighbors, but for theoretical reasons it may 
be desirable to include a large enough number of neighboring houses so that some of the houses are probably   16
in neighboring school districts, to account more directly for spillovers between school districts.  For this 
reason two extensions are shown in Table 5.  The first extension selects the nearest 200 neighbors to each 
house and re-estimates the spatial error model.  The results are shown in the 200-Neighbor SEM column.  
The second extension recognizes that if a house is in the middle of a school district, even selecting the 
nearest 200 houses may not yield any houses outside our own school district.  The second extension uses a 
unique algorithm consisting of two separate weight matrices.  One weight matrix consists of the ten nearest 
neighbors from within our own school district, and the other weight matrix consists of the ten nearest 
neighbors from outside our own school district.  Many combinations were tried, but the results shown assign 
a 90% weight to the within-school district weight matrix and a 10% weight to the outside-school district 
weight matrix.
12  Most elasticities change little, but the cross price elasticity goes from 0.32 in the Delauney 
SEM to 0.49 in the 200-Neighbor SEM.  At the same time the optimal log-likelihood falls from -587,572.1 in 
the Delauney SEM to -597,429.1 in the 200-Neighbor SEM to -1,014,737.1 in the 10 In 10 Out SEM.  The 
results suggest that the Delauney weight matrix is the most appropriate of the three.  In fact, additional 10 In 
10 Out SEM models yield even worse fit when additional weight is given to the outside-school district 
weight matrix. 
6.3 Second Stage Demand Regression Results:  Expenditures and House Size Extensions 
  An alternative to proficiency test scores to measure school quality is per pupil expenditures.  Table 6 
begins with the results of three demand regressions that use LN EXPENDITURES in the house price hedonic 
regressions in place of LN PUBLIC PROFICIENCY, and they use the price and quantity counterparts 
PRICE PUBLIC XP and QUANTITY PUBLIC XP in the second-stage demand regressions. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The first expenditures model, OLS Expenditures, uses ordinary least squares in both stages.
13  T h e  
Expenditures Delauney SEM uses the general spatial model in the hedonic regressions and a spatial error   17
model with a Delauney weight matrix in the demand regression.
14  The 200-Neighbor Expenditures SEM 
column of Table 6 uses a spatial error model with the nearest 200 neighbors for its spatial weight matrix. 
  When expenditures are used to estimate the demand curves, two of the three demand curves slope 
upward.  The only demand curve that slopes downward shows a series of theoretically curious results.  The 
most damning of these are that public and private schooling are complements and that being close to private 
schools makes people demand public schooling more. 
  Houses with a large number of bedrooms are more likely to contain children than houses with few 
bedrooms.  If having more bedrooms makes a house more marketable to families that use public schools, 
houses with many bedrooms may have different price and cross price elasticities of demand for public 
schooling than houses with few bedrooms.  The analysis is repeated splitting the sample into houses with 
three or fewer bedrooms, and houses with four or more bedrooms.  The results of the demand curve 
regressions using a spatial error model with Delauney neighbors are shown in the Small House Delauney 
SEM and Large House Delauney SEM columns of Table 6.  The own price elasticities of demand are similar 
for the large and small house samples, but the cross price elasticity differs:  it is 0.19 for small houses and 
0.36 for large houses.  The data suggest that households with children are nearly twice as responsive to 
changes in the price of private schooling than households without children.  The results appear to not to stem 
from a high correlation between the number of bedrooms and income.
15  Also, the income elasticity of 
demand for large houses (0.343) is five times that of small houses (0.067), again suggesting that households 
with children care more about public school quality than households with no children. 
Proponents of vouchers argue that vouchers would benefit students in low-income districts most; 
opponents say that low-income school districts are the most likely to suffer from funding cuts as students flee 
to private schools.  To investigate, an unreported spatial error demand model with a Delauney weight matrix 
is run that includes an interaction term.
16  The cross price elasticity is calculated for the 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles of income.  Poor homeowners have a cross price elasticity of 0.30; it is 0.34 for the rich.  It seems   18
that the rich and the poor have the same view on the substitutability of public and private schools.  The 
actual flight to private schools, and subsequent financial difficulties and incentives for improvement for 
public schools, will depend on the exact formulation of school choice program, but it will apparently not 
hinge on differing attitudes of the rich and the poor toward private schools. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
  Will school choice provide competition for public schools?  The answer depends largely on the 
degree to which public and private schooling are substitutes.  The current study estimates the demand for 
public schooling and finds the cross price elasticity between public schooling and the price of private 
schooling is 0.32.  Public and private schooling seem to be moderately weak substitutes.  That they are 
moderately weak substitutes suggests that a voucher system or a tuition tax credit that makes private schools 
more affordable will not cause a mass exodus from public schools, at least not immediately.  The results of 
the current study must be cast in light of previous research on the demand for private schooling and the 
experiences of other nations with voucher systems. 
There seem to be no other demand for K-12 public schooling studies that calculate the cross price 
elasticity of private schooling.  However, there are studies that estimate the demand for private schooling.  
Some studies find the demand for private schooling is sensitive to changes in private school tuition (Sandy, 
1992; West and Palsson, 1988), some find the demand for private schooling is not sensitive to changes in 
private school tuition (Buddin, Cordes and Kirby, 1998; Chiswick and Koutromanes, 1996), and others find 
mixed results depending on whether primary or secondary schools are examined (Sandy, 1992; Hoenack, 
1992).  The evidence is mixed on whether private school usage is responsive to changes in tuition, providing 
no clear evidence whether parents would switch from public to private schools if a voucher system or tuition 
tax credits made private schools cheaper.
17 Another way to see whether parents would switch to private 
schools is to see what happened in other countries that have enacted voucher plans.   19
  The United States is not the only country to experiment with school vouchers.  Bangladesh, 
Belize, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Guatemala, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Poland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom have voucher systems where the vouchers may be used toward the public or private school of the 
parents’ choice.  British Columbia, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, and New Zealand also have state support for private schools.
18  While Sandy (1992) finds 
Americans with low socio-economic status support vouchers the most, Willms and Echols (1992) find that 
Scottish parents with high socio-economic status were the ones who took advantage of Britain’s school 
voucher system.  Did the introduction of vouchers in other nations cause a mass exodus from the public 
schools?  The proportion of students attending private schools more than doubled eight years after Chile 
adopted private school vouchers.  On the other hand, just 17% of voucher recipients in Puerto Rico switched 
from public to private schools; most Puerto Rican voucher recipients transferred from one public school to 
another (West, 1997).  Belgium now has one of the highest private school attendance rates in the world, but 
New Zealand’s private school attendance rate has hardly changed since the government began subsidizing 
private schools in 1974 (Toma, 1996).   
If the experiences of other nations were similar, perhaps conclusions could be drawn about the likely 
effect of school vouchers and private school tuition tax credits in the United States.  But they are not.  The 
response of each nation may depend on how easily each nation’s residents believe private schools may be 
substituted for public schools.  The current study’s cross price elasticity of 0.32 suggests that public and 
private schooling are not powerful substitutes in the United States.  It is dangerous to interpret regression 
results beyond small, marginal changes in the explanatory variables.  But given the lack of guidance from 
previous literature, and the importance of the public policy question, any information we can get on the 
possible effects of a generous voucher program may be worth the risk of stretching the 0.32 cross price 
elasticity beyond its limits.  This said, a voucher program as generous as Colombia’s that covers half the cost 
of private schooling may decrease the demand for public schooling in the U.S. by 16%.     20
Some opponents of school vouchers in the United States argue that vouchers would cause 
Americans to flock to private schools en masse, leaving the poor in gutted, underfunded, and decaying public 
schools (e.g., Krashinsky, 1986; Ansell, 2003).  The cross price elasticities of the current study do not 
support such a scenario.  If the 16% number means that 16% of public school students would switch to 
private schools—which is one of many possible interpretations of the 16% number—public schools would 
still retain their dominant market share.  Furthermore, most private school systems are already near full 
capacity, so not all 16% of public school users could switch to private schools.  Faced with excess demand, 
private schools may raise tuition rates to exclude almost all additional customers, stemming the ‘mass 
exodus’ from public schools until more private schools can be built.   
The results of the current study must also account for the lack of variety seen in private schools 
today.  Existing voucher experiments in the United States are small programs with strictly limited 
participation (Merrifield, 2002; Merrifield and Salisbury, 2005).  Such experiments provide little clue about 
how many students would switch if there were widespread voucher programs.  The current study is based on 
the premise that public schools already face a certain degree of competition from existing private schools.  
By studying the elasticity of substitution between them, it can provide some clue about how many students 
would take advantage of private school vouchers and tuition tax credits.  But the 0.32 elasticity of 
substitution generated by today’s data may underestimate the long-run response to vouchers.  Today, parents 
must choose between “free” public schools and a limited set of private school alternatives.  But as Merrifield 
(2002; and Salisbury, 2005) notes, a voucher system may spawn a supply-side response that yields a vast 
array of private schools with innovative, attractive educational menus.  As the alternatives become more 
attractive, a larger proportion of parents will probably redeem their vouchers at private schools, so the cross 
price elasticity of the current study may best be viewed a lower-bound, short-run estimate of the degree to 
which public schools might lose support to private schools under a voucher program.     21
In short, given the 0.32 cross price elasticity, capacity constraints, and the lack of variety of types 
of private schools, the current study suggests that if vouchers or tuition tax credits were enacted, public 
schools would have some time to compete to retain their students.  Even though the move from public to 
private schools would at first resemble a trickle rather than a steady stream, the public schools may still 
respond to the increased competition.  The mere introduction of school choice may scare public schools into 
greater efficiency and effectiveness (Figlio and Rouse, 2006), encouraging parents to continue to support the 
public schools with their tax levies, school voucher money, and talented children; and limiting the market 
share of private schools to something close to the 12% it currently commands. 
The study supports the following additional findings.  The average elasticity of house price with 
respect to public proficiency test scores is 0.15.  Own price elasticity of demand is -1.72.   The spatial model 
reveals a more price elastic demand curve than studies that fail to address spatial dependence and omitted 
variable bias through spatial statistics.  Income elasticity of demand is 0.31, and poor and rich households 
have nearly identical views on the substitutability between public and private schools.  Compared to those 
living in houses with three or fewer bedrooms, people who live in houses with a large number of bedrooms 
have stronger cross price and income elasticities of demand for public schooling.   22
 
TABLE 1:  Hedonic Definitions, Sources, and Means
a
 
Variable Name  Definition (Source)  Full Sample 
Means (σ) 
HOUSE PRICE  Sale price of house in 2000 in U.S. dollars (1)  135543 
(100225) 
ONESTORY  Dummy variable = 1 if house is one story (1)  0.44 
(0.50) 
AIR CONDITIONING  Dummy variable = 1 if house has central air conditioning (1)  0.30 
(0.46) 
FIREPLACES  Number of fireplaces the house has (1)  0.49 
(0.59) 
FULLBATHS  Number of full bathrooms (toilet plus shower) the house has (1)  1.46 
(0.60) 
PARTBATHS  Number of partial bathrooms (toilet but no shower) the house has 
(1) 
0.46 
(0.54) 
AGE  Age of house in hundreds of years (1)  0.42 
(0.31) 
HOUSE SIZE  Building size in tens of thousands of square feet (1)  0.16 
(0.07) 
YARD SIZE  Lot size in tens of thousands of square feet (1)  2.03 
(5.13) 
TAX RATE  Tax year 2000 class 1 (agricultural and residential) tax rate in 
school district in effective mills (2) 
32.50 
(6.12) 
AIR POLLUTION  All point-source air releases in Census tract of the house in tens 
of thousands of pounds (3) 
2.28 
(24.24) 
RACIAL 
HETEROGENEITY 
Leik (1966) index of racial heterogeneity of Census block group 
of the house, where 0 is racially homogeneous, 1 is racially 
heterogeneous (4)  
0.10 
(0.10) 
INCOME  Median income of households in Census block group in tens of 
thousands of U.S. dollars (4) 
5.26 
(2.14) 
PRIVATE 
PROFICIENCY 
Percent of private school students proficient or above in math 
section for grade 9 test for sum (average) of 2000 and 2001 test 
years, for the nearest private school to each house (5) 
49.42 
(23.92) 
PUBLIC 
PROFICIENCY 
Percent of 9
th grade students in public school district who passed 
all five sections (citizenship, reading, writing, math, science) of 
the Ohio proficiency test in 2000 test year (6) 
63.81 
(19.70) 
EXPENDITURES  Total expenditure per pupil in public school district in thousands 
of U.S. dollars, for 2000-2001 school year (6) 
7.98 
(1.21) 
Sources:  (1) First American Real Estate Solutions (2002); (2) Ohio Department of Taxation (2003); (3) U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2002); (4) GeoLytics CensusCD 2000 (2002); (5) Data collected by 
Sheila Milligan of Ohio Department of Education (2005) (6) Ohio Department of Education (2002) 
 
aNumber of observations = 93,134.  Full sample means shown with standard deviation in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2:  Hedonic Means by Urban Area
a 
 
Variable 
Akron 
Cincinnat
i 
Clevelan
d 
Columbu
s Dayton  Toledo 
Youngstow
n 
HOUSE PRICE  131209 143271  139824  151690  111232  114059  90038 
 (92186
) (106264)  (98688)  (117188)  (68236)  (76495) (53296) 
ONESTORY  0.51 0.48  0.34  0.39  0.65  0.48  0.53 
  (0.50) (0.50)  (0.47)  (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)  (0.50) 
AIR   0.065 0.15  0.23  0.59  0.54  0.08  0.10 
CONDITIONING  (0.25) (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.49) (0.50) (0.27)  (0.30) 
FIREPLACES  0.49 0.55  0.48  0.54  0.46  0.34  0.46 
  (0.63) (0.58)  (0.62)  (0.58) (0.56) (0.53)  (0.57) 
FULLBATHS  1.42 1.54  1.35  1.61  1.47  1.30  1.25 
  (0.60) (0.61)  (0.58)  (0.60) (0.59) (0.52)  (0.48) 
PARTBATHS  0.45 0.46  0.44  0.56  0.34  0.38  0.37 
  (0.54) (0.54)  (0.54)  (0.53) (0.51) (0.52)  (0.52) 
AGE  0.44 0.40  0.49  0.32  0.46  0.52  0.49 
  (0.29) (0.30)  (0.29)  (0.32) (0.29) (0.31)  (0.24) 
HOUSE SIZE  0.16 0.17  0.16  0.17  0.16  0.15  0.15 
  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)  (0.06) 
YARD SIZE  2.02 2.16  2.03  1.96  1.97  1.68  2.49 
  (4.22) (6.07)  (5.03)  (5.14) (5.04) (3.75)  (4.80) 
TAX RATE  30.02 31.92  33.81  33.62  31.42  31.00  31.96 
  (3.76) (5.36)  (8.06)  (5.99) (4.56) (4.10)  (4.31) 
AIR   1.29 4.34  0.69  2.69  0.98  2.97  2.93 
POLLUTION  (7.48) (48.68)  (7.39)  (15.31) (7.53) (11.61)  (14.55) 
RACIAL  0.077 0.083  0.119  0.114  0.085  0.133  0.075 
HETEROGENEITY  (0.069) (0.073)  (0.138)  (0.085) (0.066) (0.107)  (0.080) 
INCOME  5.09 5.51  5.19  5.71  4.85  4.81  4.16 
  (2.17) (2.20)  (2.07)  (2.37) (1.75) (1.81)  (1.28) 
PRIVATE  51.45 69.57  42.45  36.67  67.81  43.02  27.96 
PROFICIENCY  (22.30) (19.69)  (17.81)  (20.30) (22.07) (19.66)  (5.94) 
PUBLIC  63.62 64.32  62.23  65.70  62.89  61.97  65.75 
PROFICIENCY  (17.76) (17.91)  (21.23)  (18.30) (22.14) (20.52)  (21.33) 
EXPENDITURES  7.85 7.62  8.68  7.96  7.57  7.87  7.31 
  (0.71) (1.29)  (1.40)  (1.00) (1.13) (0.54)  (0.82) 
No. of observations  8446 19098  22670  22251  9381  7260  4028 
 
aMeans shown with standard deviation in parentheses below.   24
TABLE 3:  Demand Variable Definitions, Sources, and Means
a 
 
Variable Name  Definition (Source)  Full Sample 
Means (σ) 
PRICE PUBLIC  Implicit price of a unit of public schooling for each house in U.S. 
dollars, based on PUBLIC PROFICIENCY in hedonic regressions 
(1) 
280.18 
(296.15) 
PRICE PUBLIC XP  Implicit price of a unit of public schooling for each house in U.S. 
dollars, based on EXPENDITURES in hedonic regressions (1) 
1.58 
(4.58) 
TUITION  Tuition of the nearest private school to each house in U.S. dollars 
(2) 
6599.49 
(3964.32) 
QUANTITY PUBLIC  Quantity of public schooling; percent of 9
th grade students in 
public school district who passed all five sections (citizenship, 
reading, writing, math, science) of the Ohio proficiency test in 
2000 test year (6) 
63.81 
(17.21) 
QUANTITY PUBLIC 
XP 
Quantity of public schooling; total expenditure per pupil in public 
school district in millions of U.S. dollars, for 2000-2001 school 
year (6) 
0.0080 
(0.0009) 
DISTANCE TO 
PRIVATE 
Distance from each house to the nearest private school in miles (3)  4.18 
(3.82) 
CATHOLIC  Percent of the total population of each county the house is in that 
is Catholic in 1990 (4) 
21.27 
(11.04) 
INCOME  Median income of households in Census block group in tens of 
thousands of U.S. dollars (5) 
5.26 
(2.14) 
GROWTH RATE  Population growth; percent change in kindergarten thru grade 12 
enrollment minus unauthorized attendance minus out of state 
enrollment plus non-attending pupils between 1997-1998 and 
2000-2001 school years (6) 
-2.52 
(9.00) 
%NO HIGH SCHOOL  Percent of persons 25 years or older in Census block group whose 
highest educational attainment is less than a high school degree or 
equivalent (5) 
13.88 
(10.04) 
%HIGH SCHOOL  Percent of persons 25 years or older in Census block group whose 
highest educational attainment is a high school diploma, including 
equivalency (5) 
31.36 
(12.01) 
%LESS B.A.  Percent of persons 25 years or older in Census block group whose 
highest educational attainment is more than a high school diploma, 
but less than a bachelor’s degree, including Associate degree and 
some college with no degree (5) 
27.45 
(6.46) 
OWNER OCCUPIED  Percent of occupied housing units in Census block group that are 
occupied by owners rather than renters (5) 
76.28 
(19.37) 
Sources:  (1) Derived from first stage house price hedonic regressions; (2) Phone survey of all Ohio private 
schools that contain 9
th grade; (3) Calculated from Street Map 3.0, geocode.com, and Arc View softwares; (4) 
Bradley, et al. (1992); (5) GeoLytics CensusCD 2000 (2002); (6) Ohio Department of Education (2002)  
 
aNumber of observations = 93,134.  Means shown with standard deviation in parentheses.   25
 
TABLE 4:  First Stage House Price Hedonic Regressions from General Spatial Model of Equation (2)
a 
Dependent variable is LN HOUSE PRICE 
 
 Akron 
Cincin-
nati Cleveland  Columbus  Dayton  Toledo 
Youngs- 
town 
CONSTANT  9.65  10.51 9.24  10.16 9.46 8.27 8.35 
 (929.04)  (6304.21)  (10160.71)  (9211.67) (1766.01) (291.76)  (370.52) 
ONESTORY 0.018  0.036  -0.002  0.025  0.003  -0.019  0.049 
 (2.16)  (6.56)  (-0.34)  (5.48)  (0.37)  (-2.60)  (4.27) 
AIR   -0.216 -0.019  0.015  0.053  0.064 -0.007 0.070 
CONDITIONING  (-12.76) (-2.14)  (2.94)  (10.60)  (10.82) (-0.48)  (4.95) 
FIREPLACES  0.064 0.079  0.047  0.056 0.062 0.074 0.078 
 (10.02)  (17.62)  (12.67)  (15.81) (11.00) (11.16) (9.23) 
FULLBATHS  0.103 0.058  0.065  0.088 0.076 0.084 0.074 
 (12.27)  (11.44)  (13.36)  (19.57) (11.35) (9.89)  (6.46) 
PARTBATHS  0.070 0.051  0.065  0.050 0.046 0.058 0.063 
  (9.15)  (10.79) (15.61) (11.70) (7.57) (7.97) (6.86) 
AGE  -0.75 -0.46  -0.21  -0.51 -0.51 -0.43 -1.04 
  (-19.69)  (-15.29)  (-8.12)  (-21.54) (-12.91) (-9.90) (-16.96) 
AGE  SQUARED 0.33 0.13  0.01  0.25 0.20 0.08 0.48 
  (9.88)  (5.28) (0.60) (13.71)  (7.44)  (2.38)  (10.06) 
HOUSE  SIZE  3.20 3.96  2.97  4.25 3.39 3.33 3.21 
 (21.89)  (35.20)  (54.99)  (45.78) (22.25) (19.62) (11.44) 
HOUSE  SIZE  -1.91 -2.21  -0.78  -2.91 -1.89 -1.49 -1.57 
SQUARED  (-8.96)  (-11.54) (-28.52) (-19.78) (-7.17) (-4.87) (-2.68) 
YARD  SIZE  0.011 0.013  0.008  0.012 0.018 0.015 0.016 
 (6.42)  (47.53)  (32.01)  (43.05)  (11.10)  (9.02)  (7.91) 
YARD  SIZE  -5.9E-05 -3.5E-05  -2.3E-05  -4.6E-05  -0.00018 -0.00015 -0.00022 
SQUARED  (-1.76)  (-22.18) (-10.11) (-10.14) (-6.10) (-3.81) (-4.32) 
TAX RATE  -0.0015  0.0042  0.0013  0.0073  0.0038  -0.0048  0.0013 
  (-1.13)  (6.20) (3.82) (10.41)  (3.08)  (-4.96)  (0.96) 
AIR   6.6E-05 8.0E-06  3.1E-04  -5.1E-05 -0.0008 -7.6E-04 -0.0002 
POLLUTION  (0.11)  (0.12)  (1.15)  (-0.25) (-1.68) (-2.37) (-0.62) 
RACIAL  -0.31 -0.04  -0.19  -0.24 -0.15 -0.53 -0.45 
HETEROGENEITY  (-4.72)  (-0.90)  (-9.61)  (-6.75)  (-2.61) (-13.63) (-7.21) 
INCOME  0.053 0.044  0.035  0.044 0.036 0.025 0.031 
 (18.41)  (24.08)  (22.81)  (25.67) (13.78) (9.49)  (6.64) 
PRIVATE  -0.00066  0.0025 0.001 0.00057  0.00065  -0.00037  0.00057 
PROFICIENCY  (-2.82) (12.42)  (6.10)  (3.17)  (3.41)  (-1.75)  (0.71) 
LN PUBLIC  0.29  0.00037  0.21  0.09 0.21 0.07 0.15 
PROFICIENCY  (17.90)  (0.04) (26.32) (10.76)  (11.62)  (4.78) (8.53) 
Rho (ρ) 0.013  0.001  0.074  -0.002  0.029  0.23  0.17 
 (1.59)  (0.44)  (26.04)  (-0.87)  (3.04)  (26.21)  (14.12)   26
Lambda (λ)  0.38 0.54  0.37  0.57 0.38 0.26 0.17 
 (63.80)  (409.36)  (145.46)  (207.20) (51.27) (36.37) (14.66) 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.76 0.75  0.75  0.81 0.77 0.78 0.75 
Number of obs  8446  19098 22670 22251 9381 7260 4028 
 
aParameter estimates shown with asymptotic t-ratios (Anselin, 1980) in parentheses below.  Rho is the spatial 
autoregressive parameter from Equation (2), and lambda is the spatial error parameter from Equation (2). 
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TABLE 5:  Second Stage Demand for Public Schooling Regressions
a 
Dependent variable is PRICE PUBLIC  
 
 OLS  LIML 
Delauney 
SEM 
200-Neighbor 
SEM 
10 In 10 Out 
SEM 
CONSTANT  -39.07 47.75 346.30 302.47  419.21 
 (3.32)  (4.11)  (19.08)  (19.63)  (18.81) 
TUITION  0.012 0.012 0.008  0.012  0.005 
 (46.06)  (46.59)  (13.16)  (32.12)  (6.53) 
QUANTITY 
PUBLIC  -1.91 -2.07 -2.56  -2.53  -2.57 
 (-23.97)  (-26.57)  (-19.98)  (-25.05)  (-16.09) 
DISTANCE TO 
PRIVATE  5.95 6.12 3.00  3.63  0.62 
 (19.66)  (20.44)  (3.80)  (8.66)  (0.47) 
CATHOLIC  9.85 9.86 5.67  6.51  3.94 
 (95.90)  (97.28)  (20.95)  (45.52)  (7.99) 
INCOME  1.70 2.09 9.56  7.63  9.81 
 (1.65)  (2.06)  (8.04)  (6.27)  (8.36) 
GROWTH RATE  5.42 5.49 1.93  3.61  0.94 
 (41.77)  (42.84)  (8.73)  (21.63)  (3.06) 
%NO HIGH 
SCHOOL  -1.51 -1.59 -1.91  -2.11  -1.65 
 (-9.32)  (-9.96)  (-9.87)  (-11.15)  (-8.51) 
%HIGH SCHOOL  -0.54 -0.53 -1.68  -1.78  -1.53 
 (-4.22)  (-4.22)  (-10.25)  (-11.68)  (-9.10) 
%LESS B.A.  0.88 0.86  -1.50 -1.30  -1.77 
 (4.78)  (4.74)  (-6.95)  (-5.97)  (-8.24) 
OWNER 
OCCUPIED  0.43 0.43  -0.17 -0.03  -0.22 
 (5.64)  (5.72)  (-2.13)  (-0.31)  (-2.85) 
Lambda (λ)  - -  0.81  0.61  0.91 
 -  -  (325.81)  (98.29)  (290.20) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.13  0.13  -  -  - 
Log-likelihood -  -  -587,572.1 -597,429.1 -1,014,737.1 
aParameter estimates shown with t-ratios in parentheses below; they are asymptotic t-ratios (Anselin, 1980) 
for the spatial models.  Lambda is the spatial error parameter from Equation (2), with rho set to zero to yield 
the spatial error model. Number of observations = 93,134.  OLS = ordinary least squares model. LIML = 
limited information maximum likelihood model. Delauney SEM = spatial error model with Delauney spatial 
weight matrix. 200-Neighbor SEM = spatial error model with nearest 200 houses for spatial weight matrix. 
10 In 10 Out SEM = spatial error model with two weight matrices, one with the nearest 10 neighbors from 
within the same school district (assigned a 90% weight), the other with the nearest 10 neighbors from outside 
the same school district (assigned a 10% weight). 
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TABLE 6:  More Second Stage Demand for Public Schooling Regressions
a 
Dependent variable is PRICE PUBLIC or PRICE PUBLIC XP 
 
 
OLS 
Expend-
itures 
Expend-
itures 
Delauney 
SEM 
200-
Neighbor 
Expend-
itures SEM 
Small House 
Delauney 
SEM 
Large House 
Delauney 
SEM 
CONSTANT  -1595.09 3435.05  715.35  343.46  406.21 
  (-6.80) (11.01) (2.46)  (19.64)  (10.37) 
TUITION  -0.131 -0.023 -0.090  0.005  0.010 
  (-34.62) (-2.88) (-16.06)  (8.59)  (9.86) 
QUANTITY 
PUBLIC XP  166.86 -223.32  53.21  -  - 
  (8.64) (-8.07) (2.08)  -  - 
QUANTITY 
PUBLIC  - - -  -2.69  -2.91 
  - - -  (-22.76)  (-10.59) 
DISTANCE TO 
PRIVATE  -19.91 -61.07 -33.61  2.28  6.00 
  (-4.62) (-4.28) (-5.02)  (3.39)  (3.13) 
CATHOLIC  30.18 16.77 26.01  4.96  7.75 
  (20.77) (3.55) (11.50) (20.53)  (12.71) 
INCOME  709.21 209.84 418.87  2.18  12.11 
  (50.35) (15.29) (26.32)  (1.80)  (5.49) 
GROWTH RATE  39.84 25.74 42.30  1.91  1.79 
  (23.09) (9.78) (18.44)  (8.98)  (4.06) 
%NO HIGH 
SCHOOL  36.92 -8.09  7.49  -1.78  -2.65 
  (16.91) (-3.59)  (3.00)  (-9.92)  (-6.01) 
%HIGH SCHOOL  -12.96 -4.44 -14.14  -1.25  -2.54 
  (-7.14) (-2.28) (-6.81)  (-8.18)  (-6.94) 
% LESS B.A.  -8.26 -5.21  -14.10 -0.92  -2.32 
  (-3.23) (-2.09) (-4.96)  (-4.50)  (-4.98) 
OWNER 
OCCUPIED  -17.93 -6.34  -9.97  0.21  -0.44 
  (-17.06) (-7.04)  (-9.10)  (2.89)  (-2.52) 
Lambda (λ)  - 0.90  0.74  0.79 0.79 
  - (660.13)  (537.08)  (334.06)  (200.21) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.09 -  -  -  - 
Log-likelihood  - -812,850.8  -832,570.2  -444,552.3  -170,619.6 
Number of obs  93134 93134 93134  68541  24593 
 
aParameter estimates shown with t-ratios in parentheses below; they are asymptotic t-ratios (Anselin, 1980) 
for the spatial models.  Lambda is the spatial error parameter from Equation (2), with rho set to zero to yield 
the spatial error model. OLS Expenditures = ordinary least squares model with PRICE PUBLIC XP as 
dependent variable. Expenditures Delauney SEM = spatial error model with Delauney spatial weight matrix 
and PRICE PUBLIC XP as dependent variable. 200-Neighbor Expenditures SEM = spatial error model with   29
nearest 200 houses for spatial weight matrix and PRICE PUBLIC XP as dependent variable.  Small House 
Delauney SEM is spatial error model with Delauney spatial weight matrix and PRICE PUBLIC as dependent 
variable with sample of houses with 3 bedrooms or less. Large House Delauney SEM is spatial error model 
with Delauney spatial weight matrix and PRICE PUBLIC as dependent variable with sample of houses with 
4 bedrooms or more.   
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1 Some studies, like Gemello and Osman (1983), say private school vouchers would raise tax burdens; other 
studies, like Seldon (1986), say government savings could occur if the value of the voucher were less than 
the full cost of public schooling. 
2 This is just an illustration.  The actual weights come from the product of wmat*wmat*θ, where wmat has 
elements i = 1/ (square root of the sum of the elements of the i-th row), and θ is the adjacency matrix from 
Voronoi tessellation. 
3 Thanks to Kelley Pace for his expertise on deciding the appropriate model for the demand regression, as 
well as for his help in running the alternative spatial models, which required too much for my computer to 
handle, even after upgrading from 2GHz to 4GHz of RAM. 
4 The public and private school proficiency measures differ in that Sheila Milligan of the Ohio Department of 
Education was only able to find math proficiency passage, whereas the public proficiency passage is based 
on more sections.  However, this discrepancy is mitigated by the fact that passage rates on the math section 
are almost uniformly the lowest across school districts, so that passage of all sections by public schools more 
or less mirrors math proficiency passage.   33
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 A previous version of the paper is available upon request that uses the implicit price of private schooling 
instead of private school tuition.  That version of the paper uses 1991 data instead of 2000 data. 
6 The log-log functional form was the most appropriate for the public proficiency variable.  The log-log 
functional form assumes that the percent change in house price is the same regardless of whether the percent 
change in proficiency passage occurs at high, low, or medium levels of proficiency passage, an assumption 
validated by Dills (2004).  
7 The elasticities from the spatial hedonics with statistically significant parameter estimates for rho should be 
adjusted by complex spatial feedback terms (Pace and LeSage, 2005), but the small magnitude of the rho 
estimates suggests that the adjustments in this case would not materially affect the elasticities. 
8 To see if there is statistical variation between the parameter estimates, I ran a pooled OLS hedonic 
regression with PUBLIC PROFICIENCY and an interaction term between PUBLIC PROFICIENCY and 
dummy variables for each urban area (omitting Akron).  The signed t-ratios of the interaction terms are as 
follows:  -2.08 for Cincinnati, 28.2 for Cleveland, 5.65 for Columbus, -25.6 for Dayton, -2.08 for Toledo, 
and -35.09 for Youngstown. 
9 The elasticities are based on Hayes and Taylor (1996) North Dallas math proficiency Model 2; Clapp, 
Nanda and Ross (2005) town or tract fixed effect models, Downes and Zabel (2002) 8
th grade reading 
proficiency pooled regression with neighborhood variables, and Figlio and Lucas (2004) Iowa Test of Basic 
Skills 4
th grade math scores. 
10 The PRICE PUBLIC variable for the OLS and LIML models is calculated from OLS hedonic models like 
Equation (1).  The OLS parameter estimates of LN PUBLIC PROFICIENCY are 0.263 for Akron, -0.058 for 
Cincinnati, 0.230 for Cleveland, 0.056 for Columbus, 0.203 for Dayton, 0.102 for Toledo, and 0.178 for 
Youngstown; all are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
11 All elasticities are reported at the variable means, unless otherwise noted. 
12 Thanks to Kelley Pace for programming the algorithm that creates the unique dual spatial weight matrices, 
running the models on his fast home computer, and advising me on proper model selection. 
13 The OLS hedonic parameter estimates for LN EXPENDITURES are -0.183 for Akron, 0.297 for 
Cincinnati, 0.133 for Cleveland, 0.260 for Columbus, -0.372 for Dayton, 0.229 for Toledo, and -0.295 for 
Youngstown, all statistically significant at conventional levels. 
14 The general spatial model hedonic parameter estimates for LN EXPENDITURES are -0.237 for Akron, 
0.283 for Cincinnati, 0.145 for Cleveland, 0.162 for Columbus, -0.394 for Dayton, 0.211 for Toledo, and -
0.241 for Youngstown, all statistically significant at conventional levels. 
15 The full sample correlation between the number of bedrooms and income is 0.35. 
16 The parameter estimates are 0.0080 for TUITION, -3.16 for PUBLIC PROFICIENCY, and 0.115 for the 
interaction term INCOME*QUANTITY PUBLIC.  The 25
th percentile INCOME is 3.82 and the 75
th is 6.27. 
17 See also a theoretical model by Hoyt and Lee (1998) which includes a calculation of the magnitude of the 
elasticity of private school enrollment necessary for vouchers to reduce taxes. 
18 Many of these programs are discussed in West (1997), Toma (1996), Willms and Echols (1992), and Gauri 
and Vawda (2004). 